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Abstrat
Using the business yle aounting framework [Chari V., P. Kehoe and E. MGrattan
2007. Business Cyle Aounting. Eonometria 75, 781-836.℄, this paper sheds new light
on the Frenh Great Depression. Fritions that redue the eieny with whih fator in-
puts are used (eieny wedge) were the primary fator in the eonomi downturn. The
deline in onsumption an be attributed to distortions in the Euler equation (investment
wedge). In addition, fritions reating a gap between the marginal rate of substitution and
the marginal produt of labor (labor wedge) ontributed to the slowdown of the eonomy
after 1936. This drop in the eieny wedge might have resulted from nanial fritions and
tari poliies, whereas the investment wedge might have been aused by nanial fritions
due to ageny osts. A potential explanation for the deline of the labor wedge after 1936
is institutional hanges in the labor market.
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1 Introdution
During the Great Depression, Frenh output dropped by approximately 21 perent below
the trend in 1939. Consumption, hours worked, and investment also ollapsed, showing no sign
of reovery until 1936. There are three ompeting explanations for this period of eonomi
downturn. Observing that Frenh pries inreased relative to foreign pries as a result of the
devaluation of the pound and dollar, Sauvy (1984) laimed that Frane sank deeply into a
depression beause the ountry used deation route rather than devaluation to return pries to
ompetitive levels.
A seond explanation laims that the worldwide Great Depression was aused by a ollapse of
the global money supply aused by the malfuntioning of the gold standard (e.g., Eihengreen &
Sahs, 1985). Output and pries delined more sharply in ountries that remained on gold until
1935 or 1936, suh as Frane, when ompared to ountries that abandoned the gold standard in
1931. The slow adjustment of nominal wages to hanges in pries is the onventional explanation
of the non-neutrality of this monetary ontration.
Yet another explanation was oered by Laoue-Labarthe (2005), who asserted that Frane
experiened several bank runs in the early 1930s that might had been an important fator
in the eonomi risis. The banks that went bankrupt were primarily the most solvent ones.
Interestingly, several other ountries were also hit by banking rises in the early 1930s, inluding
the U.S., Germany, Austria, and Hungary (see Friedman & Shwartz, 1963; Shnabel, 2004,
2009). Although the traditional view is that the onsequenes of bank runs in Frane were not
as important as in other ountries, it is worth keeping this interpretation in mind. This paper
aims to use the Business Cyle Aounting (BCA) method, developed by Chari et al. (2007)
(CKM), to assess whih of the explanations provided by the literature is relevant to Frane.
The BCA method relies on dynami stohasti general equilibrium (DSGE) models. CKM
emphasize that many models inorporating fritions an be reonstruted as neolassial growth
models with four shoks: a measure of tehnologial hange, a labor tax, an investment tax, and
government expenditures. Within this framework, labeled the prototype model, CKM rename
these shoks the eieny wedge, labor wedge, investment wedge, and government onsumption
wedge. Fritions an also be modeled in detail, but here, in the prototype model, they are ap-
tured by wedges. The purpose of the BCA method is to identify whih wedge or ombination of
wedges would help to understand the event under study. To address this issue, CKM propose an
aounting exerise similar to the growth aounting proedure. Wedges measure the deviation
of the utuations desribed by the neolassial growth model from those observed in the data.
Thus, one an generate series for the wedges and feed them bak into the prototype model in-
dividually and in ombination. Through this proess, one an evaluate the ontribution of the
wedges to the observed utuations in the variables of interest.
The study losest to our work was onduted by Beaudry & Portier (2002). They assessed
the ability of the real business yle (RBC) model to repliate the eonomi utuations in
Frane during the 1930s. They found that the onstruted shoks to tehnologial hange were
not suient to explain the ollapse of Frenh eonomi ativity. They also demonstrated that
if one assumed that tehnologial hanges were embodied in apital, this shok would not even
be neessary to aount for the drop in output. Indeed, the utuations in labor and apital
inputs were suient to repliate the deline in output. Beaudry & Portier (2002) suggested
that the Frenh depression orresponded to a transition from one steady state to a lower one.
This movement would be aused by institutional hanges in the labor market  suh as those
led by the government of the Front Populaire in 1936  and in the apital market.
The primary onlusions of our work an be summarized as follows. The eieny wedge
seems to be the main ulprit of the Frenh Great Depression, as it is suient to explain the
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observed utuations in output throughout the 1930s. The deline in the eieny wedge may
have resulted from nanial fritions and/or tari poliies. The eieny wedge is also able to
explain most of the ollapse in labor. It is also important to understand investment behavior
during this period. However, the eieny wedge ontributes very little to the utuations in
onsumption.
The investment and labor wedges play a seondary role in the eonomi downturn. The
investment wedge aounts for a non-negligible fration of the derease in onsumption. That
wedge might apture nanial fritions aused by an ageny problem (as in Carlstrom & Fuerst,
1997). In turn, the ontribution of the labor wedge is only signiant after 1936, whih an
explain why the eonomy remained at a low level after 1936. We argue that the behavior of the
labor wedge after 1936 may have been aused by the labor market reforms arried out by the
government of the Front Populaire. The government onsumption wedge aounts for almost
none of the observed utuations in output, labor, investment, and onsumption.
Those results ontrast with the onlusions of Beaudry & Portier (2002), who found that
the shoks to tehnologial hange (eieny wedge) were neither suient nor neessary
to explain the Frenh Great Depression. Interestingly, the BCA method seems to support the
banking risis hypothesis. Indeed, the Frenh money multiplier, whih an be taken as a measure
of nanial development, is highly orrelated with the eieny wedge during the 1930s.
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 desribes the business yle aounting method.
Setion 3 disusses the Frenh data over the 1896-1939 period. Setion 4 presents the appliation
of the BCA method to the Frenh Great Depression. Setion 5 onludes.
2 The Business Cyle Aounting Approah
The rst idea advaned by CKM
1
is that many detailed models inorporating fritions an
be restated as neolassial growth models inluding shoks to produtivity, labor and investment
taxes, and government spending. This variant of the RBC model, alled the prototype model,
an be interpreted as a redued form model. The prototype model an be summarized by the
following equilibrium equations
2
:
γzγnkt+1 = (1− δ) kt + xt (1)
yt = ct + xt + gt (2)
yt = k
θ
t (ztht)
1−θ
(3)
(1− τh,t) (1− θ)
yt
ht
= ψ
ct
1− ht
(4)
(1 + τx,t) γz
1
ct
= βEt
{
θ yt+1kt+1 + (1 + τx,t+1) (1− δ)
ct+1
}
(5)
1
CKM have applied the BCA method to the U.S. Great Depression. They nd that the deterioration of the
eieny wedge over the 1929-1933 period aounts fairly well for the ollapse of U.S. eonomi ativity during
that period; however, the deline of the labor wedge over the deade is largely responsible for the weak reovery
of the U.S. eonomy. Aording to the authors, these results suggest that models with fritions that manifest
themselves as an eieny wedge, for instane, input naning problems (as originally suggested by Bernanke,
1983), and those that take the form of a labor wedge, suh as workers' monopoly power (as reently stressed by
Cole & Ohanian, 2004; Christiano et al., 2003), are good andidates to understand the U.S. Great Depression.
The BCA method has also been applied to the Belgium Great Depression by Pensieroso (2011). Note that the
BCA method is designed for any business yle utuation. This method has been applied to other historial
risis, suh as the reession in the U.S. in the early 1980s (see Chari et al., 2007), in Japan in the 1990s lost
deade (see Kobayashi & Inaba, 2006), and in the U.K in the 1980s (see Kersting, 2008), as well as the risis in
Asia in 1997 (see Otsu, 2010) and the reessions in Latin Ameria that took plae between 1990 and 2006 (see
Lama, 2011). For a ritial disussion of the method, see Christiano & Davis (2006).
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The prototype model is desribed in more detail in Appendix A.
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given the stohasti proess followed by the vetor of exogenous variables:
St+1 = P0 + PSt + ǫt+1 ǫt ❀ i.i.d. (04, V ) , St = (log (zt), τh,t, τx,t, gt)
′
(6)
Equation (1) represents the apital aumulation law, where kt stands for apital, xt for
investment, γz for the deterministi labor-augmenting tehnial progress gross growth rate, γn
for the population gross growth rate
3
, and δ for the apital depreiation rate. Equation (2) is the
resoure onstraint of the eonomy, where yt denotes output, ct denotes private onsumption,
and gt denotes government onsumption. Equation (3) represents the tehnology of prodution,
where zt is a produtivity shok, ht is labor (total hours worked), and θ is the apital inome
share parameter. Equation (4) is the equilibrium ondition on labor. In equation (4), τh,t
stands for the labor tax rate and ψ is a preferene for leisure parameter. Equation (5) is the
stohasti intertemporal Euler equation, where τx,t stands for the investment tax rate and β is
the disount fator parameter. In equation (6), P and P0 are, respetively, a matrix and a vetor
of parameters, and ǫt is a vetor of four independently and identially distributed perturbations
with zero mean and a variane-ovariane matrix V .
There are two ways to interpret the equilibrium onditions (1)-(5). On the one hand, one
an say that they simply haraterize a RBC model with a publi setor, that is, a neolassial
growth model inluding shoks to tehnology, zt, shoks to labor and investment taxes, τh,t, τx,t,
and shoks to government expenditures, gt. On the other hand, one an onsider gt, z
1−θ
t , 1−τh,t,
and
1
1+τx,t
to be measures of the distortions that interfere with the eonomi agents' behavior in
the equilibrium. Using the latter interpretation, gt measures the fritions that prevent aggregate
supply from being equal to domesti private demand; z1−θt measures the eieny with whih
fator inputs are used in the prodution setor; 1 − τh,t measures the fritions that make the
marginal rate of substitution of onsumption for leisure deviate from the marginal produt of
labor; and
1
1+τx,t
measures the fritions that distort the intertemporal Euler equation. Thus,
aording to this seond interpretation, the distorted equilibrium equations enompass more
detailed models, that is, models with expliit fritions. CKM name the distortion measures
as follows: gt is alled the government onsumption wedge, z
1−θ
t is alled the eieny wedge,
1− τh,t is alled the labor wedge, and
1
1+τx,t
is alled the investment wedge.
CKM show that one an restate more detailed models as neolassial growth models with one
or several time-varying wedges. All of the terms that haraterize the fritions in the detailed
model are aptured by the wedges
4
. Thus, a researher who has identied the main wedges
responsible for the eonomi utuations observed in the data is able to hoose whih family
of detailed models she/he should use. To evaluate P , P0, and V , CKM propose to estimate
the stohasti exogenous proess (6) using data on maroeonomi variables. The strutural
parameters are instead alibrated.
Theoretially, the realizations of the wedges are dened suh that when they are fed bak
into the prototype model, the simulated variables perfetly math the data. Let ydt , x
d
t , h
d
t ,
and cdt denote the data on output, investment, labor, and onsumption, respetively. Ad-
ditionally, let y
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
, x
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
, h
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
, and c
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
represent the deision rules of
the prototype model, where kdt is a measure of the apital stok. The apital stok is on-
struted using the data on investment as follows: γnγzk
d
t+1 = (1− δ) k
d
t + x
d
t , where the initial
3
Formally, γn and γz are dened as follows. Nt+1 = γnNt and Zt+1 = γzZt, where Nt and Zt denote the
levels of the population and of the deterministi omponent of labor-augmenting tehnial progress, respetively.
4
For instane, CKM demonstrate that a model with an input naning problem is equivalent to a prototype
model with an eieny wedge; a model with stiky wage and monetary shok is equivalent to a prototype model
with a labor wedge; a model with an investment naning problem is equivalent to a prototype model with an
investment wedge; and a model with international lending and borrowing is equivalent to a prototype model with
a government onsumption wedge. For more details, see Chari et al. (2004, 2007).
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value of apital, kd0 , is assumed to be known and the parameters δ, γn, and γz are alibrated.
Thus, the vetor of realization of the wedges, Sdt , solves the following system of equations
y
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
= ydt , x
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
= xdt , h
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
= hdt , c
(
kdt , S
d
t
)
= cdt .
The ontribution of eah wedge or ombination of wedges to movements in the real maro-
aggregates is evaluated through simulation exerises. We take an example to explain how to
implement the deomposition step of the BCA method. Suppose that one wants to evaluate the
eets of the eieny wedge on output, labor, investment, and onsumption. In this ase, one
has to anel out the three other wedges  labor, investment, and government onsumption
wedges  suh as they have no eet on the real maro-aggregates. In other words, one has
to hold those three wedges xed to their respetive steady state value. To do so, one solves
a variant of the prototype model in whih only the eieny wedge is time varying (eieny
wedge model). The eets of the labor, investment, and government onsumption wedges on
the expetations of future realizations of the eieny wedge should not be neutralized. Let
ye (kt, St), xe (kt, St), he (kt, St), and ce (kt, St) denote the deision rules of the eieny wedge
model for output, investment, labor, and onsumption, respetively. Then, one feeds the series
for apital stok, kdt , and the onstruted series for the wedges, S
d
t , into the eieny wedge
model deision rules. To evaluate the eets of the eieny wedge on the movements of the
real maro-aggregates, one simply ompares the simulated series to empirial observations.
3 The Historial Data
This setion presents the onstrution of historial data on output, onsumption, investment,
apital, and labor. These maroeonomi data are built onsistently with the prototype model.
The data set overs the period from 1896 to 1939, with the year as the time unit. We use
the data olleted by Villa (1993)
5
. The national inome aount is used to onstrut data on
output, onsumption, investment, and apital. As a measure of labor, we use data on the average
weekly number of hours worked per worker in rms and data on total employment
6
. Data on
total population is used to alulate per apita measures of output, onsumption, investment,
apital, and labor.
3.1 Output and its omponents
Output is alulated by adding together real household onsumption, real household in-
vestment, real rm investment, real government investment, real government onsumption, and
the real balane of trade
7
. In the prototype model, output is shared between onsumption,
investment, and a residual dened as the government onsumption wedge. Thus, the proto-
type model's onsumption variable is identied as real household onsumption. The prototype
model's investment variable inludes real household investment, real rm investment, and real
government investment.
5
Villa (1993)'s data are freely available on the website of the CEPII: www.epii.fr.
6
Note that we do not use data on the average weekly number of hours worked per worker in the total eonomy
(series dh in Villa, 1993) beause this time series overs a shorter period. Nonetheless, those series utuate in
lose harmony, with a orrelation of 0.995 between 1919 and 1939.
7
The historial data on real household onsumption, real household investment, real rm investment, real
government investment, real government onsumption, real exports, and real imports are labeled zm, izm, ize,
izg, zg, expozt, and impozt, respetively, in Villa (1993). These data are all measured in billion frans of 1938.
Another term should have been added to the sum to alulate the atual Frenh real GDP: the real balane of
utilization servies (series susz in Villa, 1993)  servies related to the international trade. However, there are
missing observations for that time series during the period overing World War I. Beause the share of the series
susz in real GDP is small, the onstruted measure of output is a good approximation of the atual real GDP.
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In the prototype model, output, onsumption, and investment variables are dened in de-
trended per apita terms, so their respetive empirial measures are rst divided by the pop-
ulation time series
8
and then divided by the long-run trend growth rate relative to a referene
date. Before removing the deterministi trend from the data, the per apita series of output,
onsumption, and investment are divided by the 1929 value of per apita output. As a onse-
quene, output is unity in 1929. In this way, the historial data will be dened using the same
sale as the data generated by the prototype model. Formally, these operations are performed
as follows: dt =
Dt/Nt(
Yτ
Nτ
)
(1+gz)t−τ
, t = 1896, · · · , 1939, where Dt denotes the undetrended data, Yt
the undetrended output, Nt the population, gz the long-run trend growth rate of Dt, and dt
the detrended per apita data at period t. τ represents the referene date, 1929. Beause it is
assumed that output, onsumption, and investment grow at a same rate in the prototype model,
gz is set equal to the geometri average growth rate of the onstruted measure of output over
the 1896-1939 period: gz = 1.15 perent9.
3.2 Capital
The onstruted data on investment inlude investments made by rms as well as those
made by households and the government. Therefore, Villa (1993)'s data on rm apital (labeled
kze) might not aurately reet our measure of investment. Thus, a new series for apital is
onstruted using the apital aumulation law dened in the prototype model and the on-
struted investment series: (1 + gz) (1 + gn) kdt+1 = (1− δ) k
d
t + x
d
t , t = 1896, · · · , 1939, where
xdt denotes the onstruted series for investment and k
d
t is the new series for apital. gn = 0.002
is the average growth rate of the population, omputed using population data from the 1896-
1929 period. To generate a apital series with the previous equation, we still need an initial
value for apital, kd1896, and need to assign a value to the apital depreiation rate, δ. We di-
vide Villa (1993)'s data on rm apital by the population series. In a seond step, we divide
the per apita series of rm apital by the 1929 value of per apita output and detrend the
resulted series: kft =
Kft /Nt(
Yτ
Nτ
)
(1+gz)t−τ
, t = 1896, · · · , 1939, where Kft is Villa (1993)'s data on
rm apital and τ represents the referene year, 1929. We then assume that the new apital
series, kdt , and Villa (1993)'s data on rm apital expressed in detrended per apita terms, k
f
t ,
take the same value in 1896. Finally, we alibrate the apital depreiation rate using the steady
state expression of the apital aumulation law, rms' apital stok, kft , and investment, x
d
t :
δ = 1− (1 + gz) (1 + gn)+
(
x
kf
)
, where
(
x
kf
)
denotes the sample mean of the investment-apital
ratio,
xdt
kft
, over the 1896-1939 period. Thus, δ is equal to 0.0664.
3.3 Labor
In the prototype model, the labor variable is dened as the share of total time endowment an
individual spends working eah period. Thus, the empirial measure of this variable is omputed
8
The population series is labeled pop in Villa (1993).
9
Choosing a value for gz is not an easy task beause the detrending proedure is extremely sensitive to this
value. In their study of the Frenh Great Depression, Beaudry & Portier (2002) disussed dierent possible
values of gz (see Table 1 in Beaudry & Portier, 2002). They hose the value of 2.98 perent for gz. This number
orresponds to the average growth rate of Frenh real GDP over the 1896-1994 period, exluding the periods
overing the Great Depression period and the two World Wars. However, this value does not seem relevant if one
wants to estimate a model for the period from 1896 to 1939. Indeed, we an show that the detrending proedure,
with gz = 2.98 perent, introdues a spurious dereasing trend in the data instead of removing the true inreasing
trend. A plot omparing the undetrended data with the detrended data (with gz = 2.98 perent) is available
upon request.
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as follows. The total number of hours worked for eah period of the sample is alulated as
THdt = EMP
d
t ×WH
d
t × 52, t = 1896, · · · , 1939, where WH
d
t denotes the data on the average
weekly number of hours worked per worker in rms and EMP dt denotes the data on total
employment(Villa, 1993, labeled dhe and emp, respetively). The number 52 refers to the number
of weeks within a year. We express the total number of hours worked in per apita terms:
Hdt =
THdt
Nt
, t = 1896, · · · , 1939. Finally, the series Hdt is divided by the total time an individual
is, on average, endowed eah period (L) to obtain the empirial measure of labor h˜dt : h˜
d
t =
Hdt
L , t = 1896, · · · , 1939. We assume that eah individual an alloate L = 4992 hours per year
between market and non-market ativities
10
.
The time series for labor has missing observations between 1914 and 1918 and presents a
dereasing trend over the 1896-1939 period. However, in the prototype model, it is assumed that
labor is a stationary variable. Therefore, the labor series is detrended to remove the dereasing
trend: hdt =
h˜dt
(1+gh)t−τ
, t = 1896, · · · , 1913, 1919, · · · , 1939, where hdt is the detrended measure
of labor and gh is the average growth rate of labor11. The year of referene, τ , is still set to
1929.
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Model solution
The system of equilibrium equations of the prototype model is log-linearized in the neigh-
borhood of the deterministi steady state. Then, the method developed by Klein (2000) is used
to ompute the deision rules from the obtained log-linear system of equilibrium equations.
4.2 Prototype model parameter values
To solve the prototype model, we need to assign values to the parameters and to the steady
state levels of the wedges. The prototype model parameters an be partitioned into two sets.
The rst set gathers the strutural parameters of the prototype model: Ψ = {β, θ, ψ, δ, γz, γn}.
The seond set gathers the parameters of the wedge proess: Θ = {P, Q}, where Q is a lower
triangular matrix, dened suh that QQ′ = V . The steady state levels of the wedges are stored
in a third set: ∆ = {z, τh, τx, g}.
The elements in Ψ and ∆ are alibrated aording to the long-run properties of the historial
data, whereas the parameters belonging to Θ are estimated by maximum likelihood.
4.2.1 Calibration
The deterministi labor-augmenting tehnial progress gross growth rate, the population
gross growth rate, and the apital depreiation rate were omputed in the previous setion:
γz = 1.0115, γn = 1.002, and δ = 0.0664, respetively. The disount fator parameter, saled
by the deterministi labor-augmenting tehnial progress growth rate,
β
γz
, is set to 0.96; hene,
β = 0.9710. This value of the saled disount fator is ommonly used in the equilibrium business
yle literature. The values of β and γz imply a steady state real interest rate of about 4 perent
per year. The apital share parameter, θ, is set to 0.34, as in Beaudry & Portier (2002). Those
authors nd that 66 perent of the output went to labor in the interwar period. The preferene
for leisure parameter, ψ, is normalized to unity.
10L = number of hours per day (16) × number of days per week (6) × number of weeks per year (52).
111+ gh =
[(
1 + gh1
)
×
(
1 + gh2
)]1/2
, where gh1 and gh2 are the geometri average growth rates of labor over
the 1896-1913 period and the 1919-1939 period, respetively.
7
The steady state levels of the four wedges, olleted into ∆, are alibrated as follows. Using
the historial data and the equilibrium equations, (3) and (4), we generate data for the eieny
and labor wedges, respetively: zdt =
(
ydt
(kdt )
θ
(hdt )
1−θ
) 1
1−θ
and τdh,t = 1 −
ψ
1−θ
hdt
1−hdt
cdt
ydt
, where ydt
is the onstruted output series and cdt is the onstruted onsumption series. We evaluate the
steady state levels of the eieny and labor wedges relative to their respetive sample mean
over the 1919-1929 period: z = 2.3747 and τh = 0.6035
12
. We use the equilibrium equation (2)
to generate data for the government onsumption wedge gdt = y
d
t − c
d
t −x
d
t . In other words, that
wedge is measured by the sum of the publi expenditures and balane of trade. At the end of
World War I, Frane had a large trade deit. It took Frane almost all of the 1920s to improve
its balane of trade. Therefore, we set the steady state level of the government onsumption
wedge to its 1929 value g = gd1929 = 0.0048. Beause the equilibrium equation (5) is expressed in
terms of expetations, one annot use it to generate a measure of the investment wedge. Instead,
we use its steady state expression to evaluate its value: τx = θ
(y
k
) (γz
β − 1 + δ
)
−1
− 1, where(y
k
)
denotes the sample mean of the output-apital ratio,
ydt
kdt
, over the 1919-1929 period. As a
onsequene, τx is set to 0.3539. Table 1 summarizes the alibration of the parameters belonging
to Ψ and the steady state levels of the wedges, olleted into ∆.
Table 1: Calibration.
Parameters Values
Labor-augmenting tehnial progress growth rate γz 1.0115
Population growth rate γn 1.002
Disount fator β 0.971
Capital share θ 0.34
Capital depreiation rate δ 0.0664
Preferene for leisure ψ 1
Steady state level of the eieny wedge z 2.3747
Steady state level of the labor wedge τh 0.6035
Steady state level of the investment wedge τx 0.3539
Steady state level of the government onsumption wedge g 0.0048
Table 2 ompares the steady state impliations of the prototype model, in terms of ratios,
with the orresponding empirial quantities over dierent periods, that is, 1919-1929, 1896-1929,
and 1896-1939. The prototype model reprodues quite well, in the steady state, the long-run
properties of the historial data. Thus, the alibration desribed above seems aeptable.
Table 2: Steady state properties of the prototype model vs. long-run properties of the Frenh data.
Ratio Prototype model Frane 1919-1929 Frane 1896-1929 Frane 1896-1939
c/y 0.8088 0.8089 0.8136 0.8133
x/y 0.1858 0.2002 0.1897 0.1875
y/k 0.4302 0.4137 0.4398 0.4251
k/h 8.5245 8.8464  
x/k 0.0799 0.0831 0.0833 0.0799
y/h 3.6671 3.6602  
12
We skip the Great Depression period beause that period would have too large an eet on the sample means
beause of the sample size. It would be better to inlude the pre-1919 period in the omputation of the sample
means of the wedges. However, beause of missing observations in the historial measure of labor during World
War 1, there are also missing observations in the measures of the eieny and labor wedges over the 1914-1918
period.
8
4.2.2 Estimation
To evaluate the parameters of the stohasti proess (6), olleted into Θ, we rst set up
the deision rules of the prototype model in a state spae form. Seond, we estimate the
state spae form of the prototype model solution by maximum likelihood using the Kalman
lter. The estimation of Θ is performed using the annual data on output, investment, labor,
and onsumption, overing the 1896-1939 period
13
. To implement the maximum-likelihood
estimation proedure, we assume that the data are generated by a Gaussian density. To avoid
having large utuations in the government expenditures during World War I and at the end of
the 1930s dominate the estimation of the stohasti proess parameters, we restrit the shoks
to the government onsumption wedge to be orthogonal to the shoks to the other wedges.
Therefore, matries P and Q are dened as follows,
P =
(
P¯ 03×1
01×3 p44
)
Q =
(
Q¯ 03×1
01×3 q44
)
P¯ is an (3× 3) unrestrited matrix and Q¯ is a (3× 3) lower triangular matrix. p44 and q44 are
salars. The restritions on matries P and Q were suggested by CKM in their analysis of the
U.S. Great Depression. The estimation results of the parameters of the stohasti proess are
displayed in Table 3.
Table 3: Estimated parameters of vetor AR(1) stohasti proess.
Coeient matrix P on lagged states Coeient matrix Q suh that V = QQ′


0.2810 1.0212 0.8148 0
(0.2993)a (0.7104) (0.3663)
−0.0092 0.9575 0.0239 0
(0.0598) (0.0979) (0.0733)
−0.3838 0.7781 1.3290 0
(0.2486) (0.5329) (0.3086)
0 0 0 0.6172
(0.1979)




0.0722 0 0 0
(0.0080)
−0.0000 0.0149 0 0
(0.0027) (0.0023)
0.0531 −0.0264 0.0160 0
(0.0108) (0.0000) (0.0030)
0 0 0 0.0217
(0.0055)


a
Numbers in parentheses are quasi-maximum-likelihood standard errors (Hamilton, 1994).
4.3 The wedges
4.3.1 Measuring the wedges
Using the data on output, labor, investment, and onsumption, we apply the Kalman lter
and smoother on the state spae form of the prototype model solution to obtain estimates of
the realizations of the wedges
14
. Figure 1 displays the realizations of the wedges in Frane over
13
We follow Harvey (1989, Setion 3.4.7) in dealing with the missing observations in labor data when we
estimate the prototype model. Following CKM, we add to the likelihood funtion a penalty term proportional
to max (|λP,max| − 0.995, 0)
2
, where λP,max stands for the maximal eigenvalue of P , to ensure the stationarity of
the exogenous stohasti proess for the wedges (the details of the maximum likelihood proedure are available
upon request).
14
CKM propose to measure the eieny, labor, and government onsumption wedges using the equilibrium
equations (2)-(4) and the investment wedge using the deision rules of the prototype model. Both methods give
the same measures of the wedges.
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the 1929-1939 period. They appear in their respetive distortive form, that is, in the way that
they are identied in the equilibrium equations of the prototype model, (2)-(5). Although the
government onsumption wedge is given in levels, the eieny, labor, and investment wedges
are normalized to 100 in 1929. Eieny and labor wedges derease during the 1930s. In
partiular, the eieny wedge dereases strongly between 1930 and 1936. After 1936, one an
observe an attempt at a reovery, but it is not sustained beause the eieny wedge falls again
from 1938 onward. The labor wedge falls dramatially between 1929 and 1932. It inreases
over the 1932-1936 period, but only slightly, as it remains below its 1929 level. Then, the labor
wedge again drops sharply. The investment wedge remains above its 1929 level over the entire
deade. The government onsumption wedge utuates below its 1929 level between 1929 and
1937. It takes negative values several times over that period. During the last year of the deade,
it inreases dramatially.
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Figure 1: Wedges, 1929-1939.
4.3.2 Interpreting the wedges
4.3.2.1 Eieny wedge
Several interpretations of the eieny wedge have been suggested in the literature in the
ontext of the U.S. Great Depression. Following Bernanke (1983), CKM demonstrate that the
fritions reated by the existene of unequal borrowing onstraints, that is, a misalloation of
inputs among rms, at in the detailed model in a way similar to the eieny wedge in the
prototype model. Therefore, nanial fritions an manifest themselves as an eieny wedge.
Another interpretation of the eieny wedge is oered by Cruini & Kahn (2003). They
demonstrate that a multi-setor dynami equilibrium trade model is equivalent to the prototype
model with a time-varying eieny wedge. In other words, the fritions reated by tari poliies
an be aptured by the eieny wedge.
In studies on the Great Depression, nanial fritions are usually related to the banking rises
that took plae in Central Europe and in the U.S. Aording to Laoue-Labarthe (2005), Frane
10
had experiened several bank runs during the 1930s. There were three waves of banking rises
in Frane throughout the 1930s, Otober 1930 to January 1931, September to Otober 1931,
and 1932 to 1933. The author argues that these banking panis were harmful to the nanial
intermediation market. Indeed, he shows that the banks that went bankrupt were primarily
the most solvent ones. Laoue-Labarthe (2005)'s laim is supported by the movement of the
Frenh money multiplier
15
. As shown in Figure 2, the latter sharply delined during the 1930s
16
.
Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the utuations in the money multiplier are globally similar to
those in the eieny wedge between 1929 and 1936. Thus, the eieny wedge might apture
the distortions in the Frenh nanial market aused by the banking risis.
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Figure 2: Eieny wedge vs. money multiplier, 1929-1939. 1929 = 100.
Following Cruini & Kahn (2003), we onstrut a measure of the fritions reated by the
Frenh tari poliies and ompare it to the eieny wedge. We ompute an annual series of
taris as the ratio of ustoms revenue to total imports over the 1929-1939 period
17
. Figure 3
15
Following Bernanke (1995), the money multiplier is dened by the ratio of monetary aggregate M1 to the
monetary base. M1 is onstruted by taking the sum of notes in irulation issued by the Bank of Frane
(available in www.banque-frane.fr under the label Billets au porteur en irulation) and ommerial
banks' and Bank of Frane's sight deposits (in Saint-Mar, 1983, ol. Dépts à vue, pp. 36-38). The mon-
etary base is dened as being the sum of notes in irulation and the Bank of Frane liabilities on urrent
aount. The latter onsist of the urrent aount of the Treasury (in www.banque-frane.fr under the label
Compte ourant du Trésor), the urrent aount of the autonomous sinking fund (in www.banque-frane.fr
under the label Compte ourant de la Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement), urrent aount and deposits (in
www.banque-frane.fr under the label Dispositions et autres engagements à vue), and other liabilities on
urrent aount (in www.banque-frane.fr under the label Dispositions et autres engagements à vue).
16
As desribed by Bernanke (1995), banking rises lead the urreny-deposit and bank reserve-deposit ratios
to inrease. As a onsequene, the money multiplier drops.
17
We take Villa (1993)'s data on import tax revenue (labeled dti) and real imports as a measure of the ustoms
revenue and total imports, respetively. As the series dti is given in nominal terms, we divide it by the output
deator to put it in real terms. Both data on real ustoms revenue and real imports are expressed in per apita
terms using the measure of population. The per apita measures of imports and ustoms revenue are then divided
by the 1929 value of real per apita output and by the long-run growth rate relative to the referene period, 1929.
The output deator is omputed as the ratio of real output to nominal output. As we did for real output, we
add together nominal household onsumption (labeled m in Villa, 1993), nominal household investment (labeled
11
displays the utuations in the eieny wedge and those in the taris over the Great Depression
period. The taris inrease throughout the 1930s, whereas the eieny wedge drops. Moreover,
it is worth noting that the eieny wedge begins to drop when the taris move up, that is,
in 1930. The negative orrelation between the eieny wedge and the taris is approximately
−0.76 over the entire Great Depression period. It seems that Frenh tari poliies may have
aused, at least partly, the deterioration of the eieny wedge during the 1930s.
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Figure 3: Eieny wedge vs. taris. 1929 = 100.
4.3.2.2 Labor wedge
Several interpretations of the labor wedge in the ontext of the U.S. eonomy have been
suggested in the literature. Aording to one interpretation (Hall, 1997), the labor wedge ap-
tures labor market fritions that lead households to spend a great deal of time in non-market
ativities, suh as job searh. Mulligan (2002) nds that the labor wedge is well orrelated with
marginal labor tax rates in the long-run but not in the short-run, notably during the Great De-
pression. Galí et al. (2007) propose to deompose the labor wedge into prie and wage markup
omponents. This deomposition would allow them to identify whih types of fritions have the
greatest eet: those related to the goods market or those related to the labor market. The
former are aptured by the prie markup, whereas the latter are aptured by the wage markup.
They nd that most of the volatility of the labor wedge omes from utuations in the wage
markup. Following Bordo et al. (2000) and Cole & Ohanian (2004), CKM laim that during the
1930s, the labor wedge aptured the fritions that had been aused by money supply ontra-
tions and workers' monopoly power. Interestingly, this interpretation of the labor wedge an be
related to the gold standard-based explanation of the Great Depression(Eihengreen & Sahs,
1985). The labor wedge would play the role of hanneling the transmission of monetary shoks to
im in Villa, 1993), nominal rm investment (labeled ie in Villa, 1993), nominal government investment (labeled
ig in Villa, 1993), nominal government onsumption (labeled g in Villa, 1993), and nominal balane of trade
(labeled export minus import in Villa, 1993) to obtain a measure of nominal output.
12
the real eonomy, indued by the malfuntioning of the gold standard. Shimer (2009) suggests
that the labor wedge an apture labor market searh and mathing fritions à la Pissarides
(1985) and Mortensen & Pissarides (1994). In models with suh fritions, the labor market has
two main harateristis. First, household labor supply behavior is dened by the deision of
whether to work rather than by the deision of how many hours to work. Seond, rms and
households spend ostly time seeking partnerships and then negotiate a wage that lies between
the marginal produt of labor (MPL) and the marginal rate of substitution of onsumption for
leisure (MRS). As a onsequene, utuations in the labor wedge an be aused by searh and
mathing fritions.
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Figure 4: Labor wedge, prie markup, and wage markup. In deviation, 1929 = 0.
Following Galí et al. (2007), we restate the labor wedge as a negative funtion of the prie
and wage markups. The prie markup is dened as the ratio of the MPL to the real wage,
whereas the wage markup is dened as the ratio of the real wage to the MRS. Using historial
data, we onstrut measures of the prie and wage markups
18
. Figure 4 reports utuations
in the labor wedge, the inverse of the prie markup, and the inverse of the wage markup over
the 1920-1939 period. It indiates that the deline in the labor wedge throughout the 1930s is
primarily explained by the wage markup. The inverse of the prie markup inreases during the
Great Depression, whereas the inverse of the wage markup dereases. Nonetheless, the move
in the wage markup is larger than the move in the prie markup. As a onsequene, the labor
wedge delines. Table 4, summarizing the seond moments of the labor wedge and the markups,
also demonstrates that the drop in the labor wedge is primarily due to the inrease in the wage
markup. Indeed, the labor wedge is strongly and negatively orrelated with the wage markup
and weakly positively orrelated with the prie markup.
It is worth investigating the harateristis of the Frenh labor market during the interwar
period, summarized in Table 5, to understand the fritions aptured by the wage markup. The
degree of nominal wage exibility is often taken as an indiator of fritions in the labor market.
During the rst three years of the 1930s, the real wage remained quite lose to its 1929 level. It
18
The deomposition of the labor wedge into prie and wage markup omponents is detailed in Appendix B.
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Table 4: Basi statistis on the labor wedge and markups, 1920-1939.
Cross-Correlation
Variable std(%)
a corr (xt, xt−1)
b
Labor wedge Prie markup Wage markup
Labor wedge 3.23 0.79 1
Prie markup 12.38 0.75 0.32 1
Wage markup 16.91 0.87 −0.72 −0.89 1
a
std: standard deviations.
b corr (xt, xt−1): autoorrelations.
then inreased, mostly between 1934 and 1936. Beause the Great Depression was a deationary
period in Frane, the inrease in the real wage means that the nominal wage was stiky at that
time. This raises the question of whether unions were strong enough to ensure that workers were
paid higher wages. Table 5 presents three measures of the strength of unions: number of strikes,
number of olletive bargaining agreements, and union membership. Clearly, unions ould not
have signiantly inreased the nominal wage during the rst half of the deade beause they
were weak. Indeed, the number of strikes and the number of olletive bargaining agreements
dereased between 1929 and 1931 and then remained at a low level until 1935. Memberships in
the two main unions  CGT and CGTU
19
 delined between 1930 and 1934. After 1935, the
situation was reversed. Table 5 shows that the number of strikes and the number of olletive
bargaining agreements sharply inreased in 1935 and 1936. In Marh 1936, the unions CGT
and CGTU were reunied, leading to a sharp inrease in reunied CGT membership. In 1935,
leftist organizations suh as unions and left-wing politial parties rallied behind one politial
and soial projet: the Front Populaire. After having won the legislative eletions of May 1936,
the government of the Front Populaire, led by Léon Blum, put several labor market reforms into
motion.
The reforms (wage levels, olletive bargaining, paid vaations, redution of the length of the
workweek without lowering nominal wages) were supposed to free the ountry from the eonomi
slump. The nominal wage inrease would stimulate demand and, therefore, eonomi ativity.
The forty-hour week would solve the unemployment problem. Aording to the authors of the
law, reduing the length of the workweek would free working time that ould be lled by the
unemployed. The implied inrease in employment was expeted to oset the redution of the
length of the workweek so that the total hours worked would not deline. It seems that Blum's
government did not ahieve its eonomi goal, as the Frenh eonomy did not reover after 1936.
However, the Front Populaire's poliies might have distorted the labor market. Indeed, Figure
1 shows that the labor wedge strongly dereases between 1936 and 1937. The redution of the
length of the workweek an be harmful for the eonomy beause the argument on whih the
law is based is misleading (Sauvy, 1984). Indeed, the argument would be aurate if all the
available workers are substitutable and mobile, whih was not the ase. As shown by Figure
5, the derease in the number of hours worked per worker eah year is larger than the inrease
in the ratio of employment to population between 1936 and 1939. As a result, the total hours
worked per apita deline between 1936 and 1939.
Turning to monetary poliy, Figure 6 displays the utuations in the nominal interest rate
20
19
The two main unions were the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and the Confédération Générale
du Travail Unitaire (CGTU).
20
We use Villa (1993)'s data on money market rate (labeled txmm) to measure the nominal interest rate.
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Table 5: The Frenh labor market harateristis.
Year Real wage
a
Year Strikes
b
Colletive bargaining
b
Divided CGT

United CGT

1929 100 1929 1213 112 Year CGT CGTU CGT
1930 101.10 1930 1093 72 1926 525, 788 431, 240 
1931 100.86 1931 261 17 1928 554, 796 370, 260 
1932 101.53 1932 330 23 1930 577, 280 322, 545 
1933 104.28 1933 331 20 1932 533, 197 258, 275 
1934 106.94 1934 361 24 1934 491, 014 264, 085 
1935 114.57 1935 420 29 1935   785, 728d
1936 123.25 1936 17087 2336 1937   4, 081, 239
1937 119.14 1937 3680 2259
1938 122.34 1938 780 
1939 120.25
a
Real wage is dened as the ratio of nominal wage to prie. Villa (1993)'s data on hourly nominal wage in
rms (labeled whpe) and the output deator are taken as measures of the nominal wage and prie, respetively.
Then, the ratio of nominal wage to prie is divided by the average growth rate of output relative to the 1929
referene date.
b
The data on strikes represent the number of strikes that took plae eah year between 1929 and 1939. The
data on olletive bargaining agreements orrespond to the number of negotiations between rms and unions
that ended well over the 1929-1939 period. These data on strikes and olletive bargaining agreements are
taken from (Colton, 1951, Table 2, p. 14; Table 7, p. 110) and (Sauvy, 1984, vol. 2, p. 226).

The data on union memberships represent the number of workers that subsribe to CGT and CGTU one year
before eah union's ongress. Those meetings took plae in 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1936, and 1938. The
data on union memberships are taken from Prost (2006).
d
The 1935 value orresponds to the sum of the size of CGT membership and the size of CGTU membership,
as these unions reunied in May of 1936.
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Figure 5: Deomposing the hours worked.
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and those in the labor wedge during the Great Depression period. It seems that monetary fores
did not play an important role in the labor wedge utuations. Indeed, the labor wedge sharply
dereases during the rst year of the deade, whereas the nominal interest rate is redued. The
inrease in the nominal interest rate that ourred between 1931 and 1936 did not have a strong
negative eet on the labor wedge, as the latter remained stable, though at a low level, during
that period.
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Figure 6: Labor wedge vs. nominal money market rate. 1929 = 100.
To assess whether labor tax poliies are responsible for the derease in the labor wedge, we
use a measure of the soial seurity ontributions of rms as a proxy for the labor tax
21
. Table
6 reports the labor tax rate and the levels of τh,t over the 1929-1939 period. Clearly, the two
variables do not follow the same pattern. Indeed, the labor tax rate is onstant during almost
the entire the deade, whereas τh,t appears more volatile. Additionally, τh,t takes larger values
than the labor tax rate.
To assess whether searh and mathing fritions ould be relevant for the understanding of
the behavior of the labor wedge, Figure 5 displays the movements in hours worked (hours per
apita), the employment-population ratio, and the hours worked per worker (hours per worker).
It seems that searh and mathing models are not useful in understanding the Frenh labor
market during the Great Depression. Indeed, between 1929 and 1936, the hours worked per
worker and the employment-population ratio equally aount for the utuations in the hours
worked. In the remainder of the deade, the employment-population ratio inreases slightly,
whereas the hours worked per worker sharply derease. Thus, the deision of whether to work
and the deision of how many hours to work seem equally important in understanding the
utuations in hours worked between 1929 and 1936. During the Front Populaire and later, the
drop in hours worked an be explained only by household deisions of how many hours to work.
21
The labor tax rate series is onstruted using Villa (1993)'s data on soial ontributions rms had to pay
when they are using labor inputs (labeled tsex).
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Table 6: Labor wedge vs. labor tax rate. Soure: Villa (1993).
Year τh,t Labor tax rate
1929 0.6207 0.01
1930 0.6477 0.02
1931 0.6492 0.03
1932 0.6623 0.03
1933 0.6395 0.03
1934 0.6504 0.03
1935 0.6516 0.03
1936 0.6347 0.03
1937 0.6819 0.03
1938 0.6826 0.03
1939 0.6920 0.03
4.3.2.3 Investment wedge
CKM laim that the time-varying investment wedge is primarily driven by partiular nanial
fritions. They demonstrate that the model of Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997) (CF) displays nanial
fritions that at in a manner similar to the investment wedge in the prototype model. Those
fritions arise beause rm loans are onstrained by their net worth due to an ageny problem.
In partiular, CF's model is equivalent to a prototype model inluding the eieny wedge,
the investment wedge, and the government onsumption wedge. The nanial fritions that are
measured by the prie of apital (or Tobin's q), qt, in CF's model, are aptured by the investment
wedge in the prototype model
22
(see Chari et al., 2004). Formally, the relationship between the
investment wedge and the prie of apital is given by
1
1+τx,t
= 1qt .
To evaluate whether the investment wedge aptures the fritions reated by CF's ageny
problem, we ompare the utuations in the Frenh Tobin's q to those in the investment wedge23.
Figure 7 highlights the lose orrelation between the inverse of Tobin's q and the investment
wedge throughout the interwar period, partiularly during the 1930s. The investment wedge
inreases throughout the 1930s, whereas output drops. This means that if this wedge must
be seriously onsidered, CF's model inluding an aggregate tehnology shok might be a good
starting point to study the Frenh Great Depression.
4.3.2.4 Government onsumption wedge
In the prototype model, the government onsumption wedge, gt, whih ats in the resoure
onstraint, measures the disrepany between output, yt, and the domesti private demand,
ct+xt. Roughly speaking, this wedge aptures fritions that take plae in the international trade
setor or the publi setor. CKM demonstrate that a detailed model with international lending
and borrowing is equivalent to a prototype model inluding only the government onsumption
wedge. Speially, they show that the government onsumption wedge is measured by net
exports in the detailed model.
22
The eieny wedge orresponds to the aggregate tehnology shok in CF's model. The government on-
sumption wedge inludes the onsumption of entrepreneurs.
23
We follow Eihengreen & Wyplosz (1986) in the onstrution of a time series for Frenh Tobin's q: qt =
Shareprices
Cost of CapitalGoods
. Cost of apital goods is obtained from Carré et al. (1972, Table 3, p.652). It is measured
by the weighted average of the relative prie of output of mehanized industries (prix relatifs biens des
industries méaniques) and buildings (prix relatifs onstrutions). The weights are respetively given by
the volume of investment in apital equipment (investissement en matériels) and building and publi works
(bâtiment et travaux publis). Share pries are obtained from Sauvy (1984, Table XIII-1, vol. 3, p. 398).
They are measured by the index of Frenh stok pries (indie mensuel des valeurs françaises à revenu
variable).
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Figure 7: Investment wedge vs. Tobin's q, 1929 = 100.
As noted above, during the Great Depression in Frane, the government onsumption wedge
utuates below its 1929 value until 1937 and then dramatially inreases. The wedge takes
negative values between 1930 and 1933 and between 1936 and 1937. Sauvy (1984) noted that
Frenh pries inreased signiantly relative to those of other ountries during the 1930s. He
showed that Frenh pries were higher than English pries during the rst ve years following the
pound devaluation, that is, between 1931 and 1936. The ratios of Frenh pries to English pries
from 1931 to 1939 are reported in Table 7. Sauvy (1984) laimed that the disrepany between
the Frenh pries and those of other ountries played an important role in the eonomi risis.
Beause the Frenh pries relatively inreased, Frane lost its international ompetitiveness. As
a onsequene, export-oriented rms dereased their prodution.
Table 7: Ratio of Frenh pries to English pries from 1931 to 1939. Soure: Sauvy (1984).
Year 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Ratio
a 0.93 1.13 1.16 1.22 1.15 1.07 0.85 0.70 0.73
a
Sauvy (1984) onstruted the ratio of Frenh prie to English prie using the
index of ost of living evaluated in gold of both ountries and assuming that
the Frenh pries are 22 perent higher than the English prie in February
1935.
Sauvy's hypothesis an be aptured by the government onsumption wedge. Indeed, the loss
of international ompetitiveness during the 1930s might have driven the wedge downward and to
negative values. Figure 8 ompares the utuations in the wedge (reported in levels) to those of
an index of ompetitiveness over the 1931-1939 period. The index of ompetitiveness is simply
alulated as the inverse of the ratio of Frenh prie to English prie. The wedge beomes nega-
tive when the index of ompetitiveness dereases. Moreover, the orrelation between the wedge
and the index of ompetitiveness is 0.67. The strong inrease in the government onsumption
wedge during the last two years of the deade may also be related to the military expenditures
18
in expetation of a war.
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Figure 8: Government onsumption wedge vs. the index of ompetitiveness.
4.4 Deomposition
In this subsetion, we evaluate the ontribution of eah wedge and dierent ombinations of
wedges to the utuations in output, labor, investment, and onsumption that ourred in Frane
during the Great Depression. To do so, we perform the deomposition step of the BCA method.
The simulations assume that the prototype model is in the steady state in 1929. Indeed, the
Frenh eonomy is lose to its balaned growth path in 1929. To ompare the simulated series
with the data, we normalize the artiial series and the historial data to 100 in 1929. Beause
we found that the government onsumption wedge does not explain the observed utuations in
output, onsumption, labor, and investment over the 1930s, we fous only on the utuations
aused by the eieny, labor, and investment wedges.
4.4.1 The ontribution of the eieny wedge
We simulate a variant of the prototype model where only the eieny wedge is time-
varying (EW model). Figure 9 ompares the preditions of the EW model to the historial
data on output, labor, investment, and onsumption over the 1929-1939 period. The EW model
performs quite well in traking the observed downward movement in output and labor. The
EW model predits that investment also delines over the deade, although the drop in the
simulated investment is larger than the atual one. However, the downturn in onsumption is
not aptured by the eieny wedge. Not only does the wedge weakly aet onsumption, but
it also inreases the latter.
The fritions aptured by the eieny wedge led to an ineient use of the fator inputs 
labor and apital  whih resulted in the deline of labor, investment, and output. However,
that wedge does not diretly aet the onsumption deision. This fat an explain the weak
eets of the wedge on onsumption.
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Figure 9: Data and preditions of the EW model, 1929-1939. 1929 = 100.
4.4.2 The ontributions of the labor and investment wedges
We simulate two variants of the prototype model. In the rst one, only the labor wedge is
time-varying (LW model). In the seond one, only the investment wedge is time-varying (IW
model). Figure 10 ompares the preditions of the LW and IW models to the historial data on
output, labor, investment, and onsumption over the 1929-1939 period.
The labor wedge an be onsidered an important fator of the Great Depression only after
1936. Indeed, the ontribution of that wedge to the utuations of output, investment, and
onsumption beomes signiant only after that date, that is, during the Front Populaire period.
Additionally, although the simulated labor and the atual labor follow the same pattern, the
ontribution of the labor wedge is less important than the ontribution of the eieny wedge.
The investment wedge fails to explain the observed utuations in output, labor, and in-
vestment, as that wedge leads those variables in the wrong diretion. The trend is dierent
for onsumption. The investment wedge aounts for a small, but non-negligible, part of the
observed movements in onsumption.
4.4.3 The join ontributions of the wedges
Above, we have shown that the eieny wedge aounts for a large fration of the utua-
tions in output, labor, and investment, but it plays no role in the utuations in onsumption.
To support this result, we simulate a variant of the prototype model where the eieny wedge
is xed to its steady state level (No-EW model). As shown in Figure 11, in the absene of the
eieny wedge, the prototype model fails to repliate the utuations in output, labor, and
investment but aurately traks the utuations in onsumption.
We have also shown that the investment wedge ontributes only to the deline of onsump-
tion. To give support to this result, we simulate a variant of the prototype model in whih
the investment wedge is xed to its steady state level (No-IW model). In this ase (11), the
prototype model predits a larger drop of output, labor, and investment and a milder derease
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Figure 10: Data and preditions of the LW and IW models, 1929-1939. 1929 = 100.
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Figure 11: Data and preditions of the No-EW, No-LW, and No-IW models, 1929-1939. 1929 = 100.
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of onsumption than what is observed in the data.
Finally, we found that the labor wedge ontributes to the Frenh Great Depression mainly
after 1936. This result an also be shown by simulating a variant of the prototype model in
whih the labor wedge is xed to its steady state level (No-LW model). As one an see in Figure
11, the No-LW model predits that output, labor, investment, and onsumption inrease after
1936, whereas they remain at a low level in the data.
Hene, the eieny wedge appears to be the main ulprit of the Frenh Great Depression.
Finanial fritions and/or tari poliies might be the primary fators in the deline in that
wedge. The investment and labor wedges only play a seondary role in the episode. The former
an aount for a non-negligible fration of the derease in onsumption, whereas the latter an
explain why output, labor, investment, and onsumption remain at a low level after 1936. The
investment wedge might apture nanial fritions due to an ageny problem (as in Carlstrom
& Fuerst, 1997). The Front Populaire poliies might be an important fator in the deline of
the labor wedge after 1936.
5 Conlusion
Beaudry & Portier (2002) showed that the Frenh Great Depression annot be explained by
total fator produtivity (TFP). The results presented here shed new light on the depression
in Frane during the 1930s. Using the BCA framework, the paper demonstrates that fritions
aptured by TFP, labeled the eieny wedge by CKM, are the primary fator in the eonomi
downturn. The eieny wedge ontributes to a large fration of the deline in output, labor,
and investment but aounts for almost nothing in the drop of onsumption. Investment and
labor wedges play a seondary role: the investment wedge an explain a non-negligible share of
the utuations in onsumption, and the labor wedge might have been a burden on the eonomy
after 1936. The government onsumption wedge has almost no eet on the eonomy. The
paper provides some interpretations of the wedges. Finanial fritions and tari poliies may
have been the major auses of the deline in the eieny wedge. The investment wedge might
apture nanial fritions that arise from ageny osts (as in Carlstrom & Fuerst, 1997). The
deterioration of the labor wedge after 1936 might have resulted from institutional hanges in
the labor market (Front Populaire reforms). Although those results do not lose the debate on
the Frenh Great Depression, they suggest that the fritions that undermine the eieny with
whih fator inputs are used are ruial for the understanding of the period.
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A The Benhmark Prototype Model
In this appendix, we desribe the prototype model developed by CKM. Consider a losed, real
eonomy where there are three innitely living agents  households, rms, and a government 
two markets  the goods and labor markets  and homogeneous goods produed by rms. Both
markets are ompetitive. The goods ould be used as private onsumption goods, investment
goods or publi onsumption goods. In the following, we present the struture of this eonomy
diretly using per apita and detrended variables.
The preferenes of the representative household are desribed by an expeted intertemporal
utility funtion,
E0
+∞∑
t=0
(βγn)
t [log (ct) + ψ log (1− h
s
t )] 0 < β < 1, γn > 1 (7)
where hst denotes labor supply. The intratemporal budget onstraint of the household is
ct + (1 + τx,t) xt = (1− τh,t)wth
s
t + rtkt + trt (8)
where trt denotes the lump-sum transfers, wt the real wage rate, and rt the apital real rental
rate. The left-hand side of (8) desribes the uses of household wealth, whereas the right-hand side
desribes the soures of this wealth. The household buys onsumption goods, ct, and investment
goods, xt. It reeives a wage bill for the total amount wth
s
t and a apital rent bill for the total
amount rtkt. Its also reeives a lump-sum transfer, trt, from the government. It pays taxes on
labor, τh,twth
s
t , and on investment, τx,txt, to the government. The household uses its investment
to aumulate its stok of apital as in (1). The household is supposed to hoose onsumption,
investment, and labor supply sequenes that maximize (7), subjet to (8) and (1), taking the
real wage rate, the real apital rental rate, and the tax rates as given.
The representative rm uses a onstant return to sale Cobb-Douglas tehnology to produe
yt =
(
kDt
)θ (
zth
D
t
)1−θ
0 < θ < 1 (9)
where kDt is the demand for apital and h
D
t is the demand for labor. Eah period, the rm hooses
the quantities of apital and labor inputs it needs to maximize its prots πt = yt− rtk
D
t −wth
D
t ,
subjet to (9) and taking the level of the stohasti omponent of the labor-augmenting tehnial
progress, zt, the real wage rate, and the real apital rental rate as given.
The government raises taxes on labor and investment and makes publi expenditures. It
uses lump-sum transfers to households (or from households, if these transfers are negative) to
balane its budget onstraint: gt + trt = τh,twth
s
t + τx,txt.
The tax rates, government expenditures, and the level of the stohasti omponent of the
labor-augmenting tehnial progress are exogenously given by (6).
A deentralized ompetitive equilibrium is dened by (i) alloations ct, h
s
t , kt+1, xt that
solve the representative household's problem, taking all pries and tax rates as given; (ii) al-
loations yt, h
D
t , k
D
t that solve the representative rm's problem, taking all pries and level of
the stohasti omponent of the labor-augmenting tehnial progress as given; (iii) pries wt, rt;
(v) initial ondition on apital k0; and (vi) stohasti proess (6). Those alloations satisfy the
prodution fator market learing onditions: hst = h
D
t = ht, k
D
t = kt. Formally, the deentral-
ized ompetitive equilibrium an be dened as a set of sequenes {ct, yt, ht, kt, xt} satisfying
the system of equilibrium equations (1)-(5), given (6).
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B Deomposing the labor wedge into prie and wage markups
CKM dene the labor wedge as a measure of the ratio of the MRS to the MPL:
1− τh,t =
mrst
mplt
(10)
Following Galí et al. (2007), we desribe how to deompose the labor wedge into prie and wage
markup omponents. The prie markup, denoted µpt , is dened as the ratio of the prie, Pt, to
the nominal marginal ost of prodution,
Wt
mplt
, where Wt denotes the nominal hourly wage. It
an also be expressed as the ratio of the marginal labor produtivity, mplt, to the real wage,
wt ≡
Wt
Pt
. Formally, one gets
µpt ≡
Pt
Wt/mplt
=
mplt
wt
(11)
When the prie markup inreases, the real wage beomes larger than the MPL saled by the
prie markup, wt >
mplt
µpt
. Knowing this, rms deide to derease their demand for labor to make
their MPL inrease and real wage derease. By doing so, rms ensure that the equality (11) is
again ahieved. The wage markup, denoted µwt , is dened as the ratio of the real wage, wt, to
the MRS, mrst,
µwt ≡
wt
mrst
(12)
When the wage markup inreases, the real wage beomes smaller than the MRS saled upward
by the wage markup, wt < mrstµ
w
t . Knowing this, households deide to derease their supply
of labor to make their MRS derease and real wage inrease. By doing so, households ensure
that the equality (12) is again ahieved.
The labor wedge expression in equation (10) an be rewritten as follows,
1− τh,t =
mrst
wt
wt
mplt
(13)
By ombining equations (11), (12) and (13), we obtain an expression linking the labor wedge
with the prie and wage markups,
τ¯h,t =
1
µwt
1
µpt
(14)
where τ¯h,t = 1− τh,t. Note that the labor wedge is inversely related to both markups. Then, we
express equation (14) in its log-linear form,
˜¯τh,t = − (1− τh) (µˆ
w
t + µˆ
p
t ) with µˆ
w
t = wˆt − mˆrst and µˆ
p
t = mˆplt − wˆt (15)
where
˜¯τh,t = τ¯h,t − τ¯h, and sˆt = log st − log s, st ∈ {µ
p
t , µ
w
t ,mrst,mplt, wt}.
Conditionally to the speiations of the prodution and utility funtions used in the pro-
totype model, the expressions for the MRS and MPL are given by mrst = ψ
ct
1−ht
and mplt =
(1− θ) ytht , respetively. In log-linear form, the previous equations beome mˆrst = cˆt +
h
1−h hˆt
and mˆplt = yˆt − hˆt, respetively.
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